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Abstract
Theory tells us that weak rule of law and institutions deter cross-border integration, deter investment relative to trade, 
and inhibit trade finance. Drawing on a survey of more than 300 Chinese enterprises that are doing or have done 
business in North Korea, we consider how informal institutions have addressed these problems in a setting in which 
rule of law and institutions are particularly weak. Given the apparent reliance on hedging strategies, the rapid growth in 
exchange witnessed in recent years may prove self-limiting, as the effectiveness of informal institutions erode and the risk 
premium rises. Institutional improvement could have significant welfare implications, affecting the volume, composition, 
and financial terms of cross-border exchange.
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History provides fascinating examples of traders who managed to organize institutions to support 
exchange in the absence of state protection of property rights and contracting, even over long distances 
(Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990; Greif 1993; Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast 1994; Clay 1997a, 
b). Such examples are not limited to the past, the development and comparative economics literature 
yields a number of contemporary examples, from trans-African trade (Kennedy 1988) to the emergence 
of contracting and informal dispute settlement mechanisms in transitional economies such as Vietnam 
(McMillan and Woodruff 1999a, b). Yet the informal institutions required to support an efficient level of 
trade are also demanding. Merchants must be able to act collectively both to protect themselves and to 
impel the sovereign to abjure expropriation, to the ultimate benefit of both the traders and the sovereign.
There is now ample empirical evidence that weak institutions have quantitatively significant effects 
on cross-border exchange. Using a gravity model, Anderson and Marcoullier (2002) find that corruption 
and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce international trade. A 10 percent rise in a 
country’s index of transparency and impartiality leads to a 5 percent increase in import volumes ceterus 
paribus. Cross-border investment may be even more sensitive to such considerations: Wei (2000) found 
that an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico had the same negative 
effect on inward foreign direct investment (FDI) as raising the tax rate by 50 percentage points. While 
private actors may be able to devise mechanisms to offset weak institutions, the level of exchange will be 
suboptimal and institutional improvements could have significant payoffs. 
Economic integration between China and North Korea represents a remarkable natural experiment 
for exploring these issues. Traditionally, trade between the two centrally planned economies was 
determined politically and was relatively small. The breakup of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of 
the Eastern Bloc and the apparent inability of the North Korean leadership to adjust to changing 
circumstances contributed to an implosion of North Korea’s economy and a famine that killed as many 
as one million people—around 5 percent of the pre-crisis population (Haggard and Noland 2007). 
The inability of the state to provide food under the existing socialist compact forced small-scale social 
units—households, work teams, local government and party offices, even military units—to engage in 
entrepreneurial behavior to secure food. 
One aspect of this coping behavior was the development of decentralized cross-border barter trade 
for food. This barter was eventually monetized and spread to a much broader array of both goods and 
actors. This “marketization from below” led to a dramatic expansion in bilateral trade (figure 1), but in 
a cross-border setting characterized by the apparent absence of conventional property rights protections, 
formal dispute adjudication mechanisms, even a published tariff schedule—in short, all of the institutions 
deemed necessary for efficient exchange. 3
This paper is based on an unprecedented survey of more than 300 Chinese enterprises that are doing 
or have done business in North Korea. The results provide some insight both into how firms manage the 
risks associated with weak institutions and the particular constraints such weaknesses place on bilateral 
trade and investment. On the one hand, Chinese firms are adopting contracts and trading mechanisms 
that are self-enforcing, i.e., do not require third-party government enforcement. On the other hand, we 
document that these strategies have costs, visible in the scale and nature of firm operations and other 
crucial elements of exchange such as the willingness to extend credit.
There are basically two sorts of Chinese enterprises doing business in North Korea: large state-
owned enterprises with long-standing relationships with their North Korean counterparts, and a 
larger number of small, essentially private businesses (regardless of their specific legal status in China) 
that restrict themselves primarily to trading activities. The majority of firms in our survey—nearly 90 
percent—report being able to make a profit in North Korea. Moreover, their assessments of the future at 
the time of the survey were generally positive; most respondents indicated that they regarded the trend 
toward liberalization as irreversible.1 
Nonetheless, Chinese appraisals of the North Korean business environment are generally negative 
and manifest fear of expropriation of investments made in North Korea. A large majority of the 
respondents complain about infrastructure issues—most notably the historic ban on cell phone use which 
is beginning to ease—but respondents also complain about the nature of the regulatory environment, 
the risk of arbitrary changes in rules and practices and lack of reliable dispute adjudication. As a result, 
Chinese enterprises limit their exposure by generally choosing trading over investing, conducting 
transactions in China, holding their North Korean counterparts to tight settlement terms, and demanding 
payment primarily in US dollars or Chinese yuan. 
Bribery and corruption are pervasive features of the business environment, and might be seen as a 
rational response to the lack of property rights protection. If bribe payments result in credible provision 
of protection, they are one political mechanism for assuring trade and investment. However, there is some 
evidence that firms face a greater likelihood of economic predation as their size increases. The limited scale 
of Chinese operations and the reluctance of firms to invest or even to engage in anything more than spot 
market transactions appears to stem directly from the absence of property rights protection and pervasive 
corruption. 
In the absence of formal institutions for dispute settlement, there is some evidence that Chinese 
businesses may seek to protect themselves from official predation via informal networks of other firms.2 
1. Since the survey was conducted in October and November 2007, a number of changes have occurred in North Korean 
economic policy, most notably a chaotic currency reform undertaken in November 2009 (Haggard and Noland 2010a). 
2. See Lin (2010) on Taiwanese investment in China.4
Recourse to other firms rather than either North Korean or Chinese authorities may constitute an 
example of how private traders can use reputational mechanisms to protect themselves. But it is again 
important to emphasize the suboptimal nature of these arrangements; most firms that have had disputes 
with their counterparties report a low level of satisfaction with the outcome. 
In sum, institutional weakness deters integration, deters investment relative to trade, and inhibits 
normal trade finance. Given the weakness of formal institutions and the corresponding limits on the risks 
Chinese firms are willing to take, the rapid growth in exchange that we have seen in recent years may 
prove self-limiting if the effectiveness of informal institutions erodes. Institutional improvement would 
clearly have significant welfare implications, affecting the volume, composition, and financial terms of 
cross-border exchange. 
WHo Are tHe PArticiPANtS?
The results reported here are derived from a survey of 303 enterprises conducted in October and 
November 2007. All the firms in the survey operated in the Chinese provinces of Jilin and Liaoning, 
although they were not necessarily headquartered there. (Details of the survey implementation are 
provided in the appendix.) Two hundred and fifty of the firms (82 percent) were engaged in trade or 
investment with North Korea at the time of the survey. As there are no public business registries listing 
firms engaged in business with North Korea, the firms necessarily constitute a sample of convenience, 
culled from a variety of sources. However, extensive interviews suggest that the sample is broadly represen-
tative of the cross-border business. 
These firms are engaged in importing, exporting, investment and the permutations and 
combinations of these three activities (figure 2). Nonetheless, pure exporters make up the largest group. 
Most are relatively small private enterprises (figure 3), and most have initiated cross-border exchange 
with North Korea since 2000 (figure 4). However there is a distinct minority of a dozen large state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), some of which have been doing business with North Korea for more than a 
quarter-century.
We also surveyed a control group of 53 firms drawn randomly from firms operating in the two 
provinces which were not doing business in North Korea at the time of the survey; 43 (14 percent) had 
never engaged in cross-border exchange with North Korea, and a small share (10 firms, or 3 percent of 
the total sample) had previously engaged in trade or investment but had withdrawn. There are a number 
of salient differences between the firms that are not doing business in North Korea and those that are, 
starting with size. Of those doing business in North Korea, 55 percent have 1-10 employees and 91 
have 100 or less. The point is even clearer if we focus on revenue: 28 percent of firms doing business 
in North Korea had sales revenues of less than 100,000 renminbi, around $12,000. Most of the firms 5
doing business with North Korea are clearly small entities. By contrast, 42 percent of the firms not doing 
business in North Korea had more than 100 employees. Six—11 percent of the sample of 53—have more 
than 1000 employees and 13—nearly a quarter of them—report sales revenues of more than 50 million 
renminbi, about $6 million. 
Ownership patterns also vary. Fifty-eight percent of the firms doing business in North Korea 
are private enterprises, and another 14 percent are sole proprietorships; only 3 percent are foreign. 
By contrast, the not-doing-business sample includes a different mix of ownership structures, with 38 
percent foreign firms and only 28 percent accounted for by private enterprises and sole proprietorships. 
Interestingly, there were not many SOEs in either sample (5 percent in the “doing business” sample, 4 
percent in the “not doing business” sample) although joint stock companies—which frequently have 
government participation--accounted for about 21 percent of the first group and 26 percent of the second 
group. 
Core activities also vary. Fully 54 percent of the firms doing business in the DPRK report that 
they are involved principally in trading; another 5 percent identify themselves as diversified groups that 
have trading operations. By contrast, only 26 percent of the firms not doing business in North Korea are 
trading companies, with a much higher representation of firms involved in manufacturing (49 percent 
of those not doing business as opposed to only 8 percent of those doing business). Among the other 
activities represented by the firms doing business in North Korea are—in descending order—construction 
(16 percent), services (10 percent), and agriculture (6 percent).
The traders were asked about the most important product that they exchanged with their largest 
customer or supplier. The findings comport broadly with what we know about bilateral trade at the time 
of the survey from aggregate trade data. For exporters, the major products included construction materials 
(including upholstery; 13 percent), apparel and clothing (11 percent), grain and edible oils (10 percent), 
and chemicals and electrical equipment (8 percent each). On the import side, the product mix is much 
more concentrated, with aquatic products accounting for nearly 30 percent of major products from 
major suppliers, with metal and metal products (27 percent) and wood and wood products (18 percent) 
accounting for significant shares; indeed, these three product categories together account for almost 75 
percent of the top imports from the dominant supplier.
Among investors, the most frequently cited motivations are to expand business in the domestic 
market (29 percent), to sell there (21 percent), or to exploit natural resources (27 percent). Only 23 
percent are locating in North Korea as an export platform, either back to China (13 percent) or to third 
markets (10 percent). We interpret these results to reflect in part weak infrastructure, but also prevailing 
policies and incentives that limit opportunities for export-oriented investment.6
The vast majority of the enterprises in the sample doing business in North Korea are Chinese (98 
percent), though around 20 percent of the control group report being headquartered outside of China, 
mostly in Japan or South Korea. Forty percent of the respondents report that their chief executive officer 
(CEO) can speak Korean. This share is virtually identical across both the firms currently doing business in 
North Korea and those which are not.
While our understanding of the Chinese participants is relatively complete, our understanding 
of their North Korea counterparts is much weaker. Figure 5 reports the Chinese firms’ responses to a 
question about the legal status of their primary North Korean counterparty, broken down by importers, 
exporters, and investors. In all three cases, the majority of respondents report that SOEs are their main 
counterparties, although this may well encompass entities of very different sorts.3 Nonetheless, interesting 
differences emerge. Pure exporters report a wider array of North Korean counterparties, including Chinese 
brokers, private firms and individual entrepreneurs. These actors have played an important role in making 
emerging markets in North Korea for imported consumer goods and even intermediates. Importers, and 
particularly investors, report a much greater dependence on official entities: SOEs, government bureaus 
and the military.
SubJective ASSeSSMeNtS of tHe NortH KoreAN buSiNeSS eNviroNMeNt 
The Chinese firms surveyed generally have a negative assessment of the business environment in North 
Korea. Among the firms not doing business in North Korea at the time of the survey, by far the most 
frequently cited reason was lack of familiarity with the North Korean market (87 percent agree or strongly 
agree). Fifty-five percent cite lack of familiarity with the country more generally and 57 percent cited the 
weakness of the North Korean economy. However, just over half (51 percent) cited the poor reputation of 
DPRK policies and 45 percent cited the poor reputation of North Korean firms. 
Among those doing business in North Korea, almost 88 percent report that they are able to make a 
profit. Is this success a political artifact of Chinese government support for trade and investment with the 
DPRK? In fact, few businesses (and none of the SOEs, surprisingly) report any support from the Chinese 
government for their activities. Seven percent of the respondents indicated that they received special tariff 
reductions or exemptions, presumably under Chinese provisions for preferences for local firms engaged 
3. The category “SOE” encompasses entities and economic behaviors of at least three different types. The first are SOEs 
engaged in their traditional, legally sanctioned lines of business. The second are SOE’s whose managers have exploited the 
company’s legal status and resources to initiate non-traditional and in some cases completely unrelated (and even illicit) 
lines of business. Third, entrepreneurs affiliate with SOE’s for political protection (Haggard and Noland 2007); the “SOE” 
may in fact be a shell for an effective joint venture partnership. Similar uncertainty about the true nature of the enterprise 
exists for other types of counterparties that are reported in the survey such as North Korean government offices. Indeed, it 
is possible that the Chinese firm itself does not even know the true “inside story” regarding its North Korean counterparty.7
in small magnitude “border trade.” A handful of firms report receiving trade insurance, investment 
guarantees, or preferential finance. But government support, narrowly construed, does not appear to play 
a significant role in enabling exchange. 
Respondents do see some positives in the operating environment. Among the firms doing business 
in the country, a slight majority believe that it is getting easier to do business in North Korea.4 About 
50 percent cite the reduction in trade barriers and the emergence of general markets as positive features 
in the operating environment. It is possible that at the time of the survey, the business environment was 
improving because of progress on the nuclear issue during 2007 and the announcement and staging of 
a second North-South summit just prior to the survey. It may also be the case that learning takes place: 
agreement with the statement that North Korean regulations make it hard to do business is negatively 
correlated (at the 10 percent level) with length of involvement with North Korea.5
However, we also asked the firms doing business in North Korea a series of ten questions about 
the factors that impede their business (figure 6). Most firms report problems with infrastructure; large 
majorities indentify the ban on cell phones (86 percent) and inadequate infrastructure (79 percent) as 
constraints. However, regulation is also a major hindrance, with 79 percent citing changing regulations, 
70 percent citing the nature of regulations, and just over 60 percent reporting that it is impossible to do 
business outside the special economic zones and that there is expropriation risk.6 
We can assess the effects of these perceptions on entry by comparing the attitudes of those doing 
business in North Korea with those not doing business there, using simple t-tests. Perceptions on some 
issues do not exhibit significant differences between the two sets of firms; firms of both sorts have similarly 
negative assessments along these dimensions. For example, perceptions of the quality of infrastructure 
and barriers posed by weak telecommunications do not show significant differences. However, there are 
statistically significant differences in their views of North Korea’s institutional environment. Firms not 
doing business are more likely to report that the depreciating currency poses a barrier to their business 
(at the 1 percent level), but are also more likely to see high taxes and the regulatory environment (at the 
1 percent level) and the perceived difficulty of doing any business outside the special economic zone (at 5 
percent level) as barriers. Perceptions of a problematic business environment potentially deter entry. 
The trading firms doing business in North Korea are more likely to agree (at the 5 percent level) 
with the statement that is it too risky to invest because of potential expropriation, suggesting that such 
4. As noted earlier, a number of changes have occurred in North Korean economic policy since the survey was conducted 
and it is not known whether the respondents still hold these views. 
5. This finding held for all those doing business and the subsample of traders, though not for investors.
6. Since the survey was conducted, the ban on cell phones has been lifted with the Egyptian firm Orascom introducing 
domestic cellular service through most of the country (Noland 2009). Whether the foreign firms’ needs for international 
connections have been fully addressed is unknown.8
fears push firms away from investment and toward trading modalities. Likewise compared to those not 
doing business, investors complain even more frequently (at the 5 percent level) than traders about high 
taxes (at the 10 percent level), which could be interpreted broadly as a proxy for government-related costs 
of doing business. 
corruPtioN, DiSPute reSoLutioN, AND SettLeMeNt terMS 
The survey provides evidence of the business environment in North Korea that goes beyond subjective 
assessments to corruption, the weakness of dispute resolution and the effects of the environment on 
the terms of financial settlement. The findings on corruption are consistent with evidence from refugee 
surveys, including testimonies of former state and party officials, of high—and possibly rising—levels of 
corruption in North Korea, (Haggard and Noland 2010b, Kim 2010). 
Most of the Chinese firms report that they are required to get permission or approval from some 
level of the North Korean government to do business in North Korea, though there are differences across 
types of firms. All of the Chinese SOEs report having obtained permission before starting a business, but 
29 percent of the private businesses report that they did not obtain any permission or approval by the 
North Korean government. Only 9 percent of investors—six firms—report that they have no need of 
government approval. By contrast 29 percent of traders and 47 percent of those who are engaged only in 
exports to North Korea report that they have no need of government approval to operate. 
A majority of the firms in our survey report a need to bribe to do business (55 percent). However, 
investors are much more likely to report a need to bribe (73 percent) than traders (54 percent) or those 
engaged in exporting only (44 percent); these differences between investors, traders and exporters are 
significant at the 1 percent level. We also asked about actual bribe costs, and the differences between 
investors and traders are once again clear. Nineteen percent of the firms report spending more than 10 
percent of revenues on bribes, but more than half of investors (53 percent) report spending more than 
10 percent of annual revenues on bribes. These differences presumably reflect the greater complexity 
of entering as an investor, the more extensive contact with local officials, and the greater risk of 
expropriation.7 
A critical feature of the institutional environment is the capacity of investors and traders to resolve 
disputes. The survey permitted respondents engaged in multiple types of business to characterize each of 
7. This pattern of response appears to be borne out of experience. The responses are similar for the quitters; they do not 
appear to have distinctly harsh views of North Korea. Among the firms that had never done business in North Korea, 
most were uncertain about the need to bribe to do business; 37 percent thought that bribery was necessary and 12 percent 
did not. The firms never having done business in North Korea had lower perceptions of the incidence of bribery at the 5 
percent level of statistical significance. 9
their principal business relationships separately, for example, allowing a single firm to report on relations 
with its main import, export, and investment partner. 
Disputes appear to be fairly common. Twenty-one percent of these relationships had generated 
disputes. The pattern of disputes was fairly uniform across types of business relationships: exporters (19 
percent), importers (24 percent), and investors (23 percent). But if we compare investors with those who 
export only, we once again see evidence of the hold-up problem. Fully 41 percent of investors report 
disputes, while only 4 percent of exporters do. Weak dispute settlement appears to push firms back to less 
risky, “cash and carry” transactions. 
When asked how they would resolve a dispute, the pattern of responses across exporters, importers 
and investors differed in predictable but interesting ways; we focus here on the differences between 
exporters and investors. More than one-quarter of exporters indicated that there were no third parties 
from which they could seek help. To the extent that they did believe there was recourse, it was entirely 
on the Chinese side of the border: Twenty percent indicated that they would seek help from Chinese 
government officials, 19 percent would look to other Chinese companies or business associations, and 17 
percent would use the Chinese court system.8 Although the number of disputes reported on the part of 
pure exporters was small (only 5 of 113 pure exporters), their pessimism was warranted; none of the five 
reported they were satisfied with the process of dispute resolution.
For the investors, more than one-third would try to settle matters privately (35 percent), 31 percent 
would appeal to North Korean local officials, and 22 percent to Chinese officials, presumably reflecting 
the far greater importance of North Korean officials in settling investment disputes that involve the 
foreign investor’s physical presence in North Korea. It is also notable that the share reporting that they 
would appeal to local officials (31 percent) exceeded that of provincial officials (16 percent) and central 
government officials (12 percent). This pattern is consistent with a reduction in de facto central control 
that was a byproduct of “marketization from below,” but it may also reflect the fact that investors see local 
officials as more forthcoming.9 
Whatever the investors thought ex ante, their disaffection after the fact is high; 77 percent report 
that they were not satisfied with the way their dispute was settled (and recall that the share of investors 
reporting disputes was also much higher than firms involved in export only). When asked about how they 
8. Multiple responses for dispute resolution modalities were permitted. If the modality figures are calculated as a share 
of total responses (not number of enterprises), the exports results are Chinese government officials (13 percent), other 
Chinese firms or business association (12 percent), and Chinese courts (11 percent). For imports the results are private 
negotiation (23 percent), North Korean local officials (12 percent), and Chinese officials (9 percent). For investors the 
results were private negotiation (21 percent), local North Korean officials (18 percent), and Chinese officials (13 percent). 
In no case did the North Korean court system’s share of responses reach 10 percent.
9. In the past year the North Korean government has tried to reverse this trend, specifically centralizing the foreign 
investment approval process.10
would settle disputes in the future, respondents suggest that local and provincial officials may be more 
willing to protect property rights than their higher ups. Investors who experienced disputes showed a 
greater proclivity to pursue resolution of future disputes through appeals to local officials (32 percent v. 19 
percent) and provincial officials (25 percent v. 7 percent). 
Settlement terms also provide insight into the credibility of the operating environment. None of 
the traders report doing any business in North Korean won. While this might reflect simple exchange 
rate risks, a long history of currency revaluations—culminating in the conversion of December 2009—
suggests that the risk is also political. Most Chinese exporters to North Korea use Chinese yuan as the 
settlement currency (55 percent), possibly reflecting the preference of small traders to be paid in local 
currency, followed by US dollars (34 percent), and barter (8 percent). Imports, by contrast, are settled 
primarily in US dollars (52 percent), followed by Chinese yuan (29 percent), and barter (15 percent). 
The more frequent use of US dollars in the import trade may reflect the preferences of sellers who want 
to get paid in home or conveniently usable currencies; it could also reflect the distinctive preferences of 
North Korean SOEs (more highly represented among Chinese importers’ counterparties) and/or the 
North Korean government which may desire to earn convertible currency that does not have to be spent 
in China. 
Finally, settlement terms are typically very tight, reflecting lack of trust and credit. Less than 5 
percent of the traders report extending credit to their suppliers. Most trade is settled at time of delivery; 
the next most frequently occurring moment of payment is at time of order placement. Less than 10 
percent of import and 5 percent of export transactions occur more than 30 days after delivery. Particularly 
given dissatisfaction with dispute settlement, it is not difficult to understand why credit is limited.
eNtry, exit, AND MoDALity
What distinguishes enterprises that enter the market from those that do not? Among those that enter, 
what determines who subsequently leaves? A related question is what drives choices regarding different 
types of business activity: whether firms choose to export and import only, or to invest or engage in 
some more complex combination of business activities. Investing clearly involves much more substantial 
hold-up risk, as it does in a market economy as well. We would therefore expect the property rights, 
contracting and regulatory environment to matter more to investing firms. 
Probit regressions estimated on entry are summarized in table 1. Ownership type and size matter. As 
shown in specification 1.1, private ownership is positively associated with entry, and size, as measured by 
number of employees, is negatively associated with entry. This relationship is specified slightly differently 
in specification 1.2 with a similar result: firms choosing to engage in business with North Korea are 
smaller and more likely to be private than their counterparts.11
With respect to business activity, service providers are deterred from entry. This could be because of 
North Korean regulations that create explicit entry barriers, but it could also be because service activities 
require a local presence which is more risky than arms-length trade transactions.10 
Also of interest is what does not appear to matter. Variables relating to enterprises’ sources of funding 
were statistically uncorrelated with entry. In regressions not reported in the interests of brevity, neither 
provincial location of the firms’ headquarters nor having a headquarters in a border town are statistically 
significant. Nor is having a chief executive officer (CEO) who speaks Korean. These characteristics—
proximity and language skills—might be associated with being more informed about the North Korean 
business environment or the ability to make more nuanced risk assessments, yet they neither incline firms 
toward or away from doing business. 
We would like to know how ex ante appraisals of the North Korean business environment affect the 
likelihood of entry, but we face a specification problem in teasing this out of our survey data. The 260 
enterprises with current or past experience in North Korea have appraisals that are informed by experience 
ex post. Econometrically, the values of these regressors may not be predetermined, violating the classical 
assumption of the independence of the error term and rendering the coefficient estimates inconsistent. 
With this caveat acknowledged, specification search suggested that there were three of these variables 
correlated with entry: views regarding the falling value of the North Korean currency and high taxes 
(negatively) and ability to make a profit (positively). As shown in table 1, there is some evidence that 
the responses on taxes and profitability are correlated with entry holding firm characteristics constant. 
Enterprises that believe that taxes are too high are deterred from entry and those expecting to make profits 
enter. If we were able to observe true ex ante assessments of the business environment, the list could well 
be longer.
One particular null finding deserves mention. The perception or knowledge of the necessity for 
bribery to do business with North Korea was uncorrelated with entry. Approximately 70 percent of both 
firms that entered and did not enter North Korea believed that bribery was necessary to do business in the 
country; this information did not constitute a deterrent. As we will see below, however, there is evidence 
that the respondents’ ex ante assessments may have underestimated the actual extent of corruption in 
North Korea. 
We are not only interested in whether these enterprises enter the North Korean market but how 
they do so. There are seven modality combinations (export only, export and invest, export and import, 
etc.) and our sample contains some enterprises in each cell. In principle we could model this as an 
10. That said, North Korea’s largest private investment has been by the Egyptian cellular telephone operator Orascom in a 
joint venture with a North Korean government entity (Noland 2009).12
unordered polychotomous response model (and indeed tried) but the limited numbers of observations in 
some cells make this effectively impossible in practice. 
Instead, we have adopted the more tractable approach of analyzing the decision to invest, 
conditional on the decision to enter (table 2). The results confirm the observation from the descriptive 
statistics of a peculiar distribution of quite different types of entrants. On the one hand, larger firms—
as measured either by sales or employment (2.1)—are more likely to invest, but so are firms in the 
small, private category (2.2). Specification search suggested that the unavailability of outside funds was 
negatively associated with a decision to invest, though the statistical significance of this relationship is not 
borne out in specifications 2.1 and 2.2. 
Having a Korean-speaking CEO is uncorrelated with investing (as it was with entry). But having a 
headquarters in a border town is actually negatively correlated with investing once firm characteristics are 
taken into account. If we take proximity as a proxy for information, knowing more about North Korea 
appears to deter investment. 
We noted with respect to entry that knowledge of the necessity to bribe was not a deterrent. 
By contrast, expectations of the need to bribe were positively correlated with investing (though the 
relationship is statistically insignificant in the table 2 regressions). For the reasons of simultaneity 
outlined above, these results should not be given a causal interpretation (i.e., bribery does not lead to 
more investment). Nonetheless, the results are intriguing. They suggest that firms which have invested 
in local operations and developed a more extensive understanding of the North Korean economy have a 
more keen appreciation of the ubiquity of corruption (and the inadequacy of infrastructure) than their 
presumably less well-informed peers.
Finally, we added four variables relating to expectations about dispute resolution. Does the perceived 
ability to resolve disputes through different channels influence the decision to invest? We aggregated 
the 12 possible modalities for dispute resolution into four key types: informal North Korean resolution 
through direct appeals to North Korean officials; formal North Korean resolution through the courts; 
official Chinese resolution, including through both the courts and political appeals; and informal 
resolution through Chinese third party networks such as industry associations. The coefficients are relative 
to an omitted category that is defined by completely private informal dispute resolution such as direct 
bilateral negotiation.
The results reported in table 2 are quite interesting. The expectation that one could appeal to North 
Korean officials for dispute resolution is positively associated with investing. Citing formal adjudication 
through the courts has no impact. Likewise, the expected availability of Chinese dispute resolution 
mechanisms, while possibly valuable in the case of trade, have no impact on the decision to invest; this 
makes sense given that Chinese officials are likely to have influence over investments in North Korea only 13
where they are very large and engage the political leadership directly. Finally, the expectation of having 
to rely on informal Chinese third party mechanisms is negatively associated with actually investing. 
Whatever benefits these networks may have, they are—probably rightly—not seen as providing recourse 
in investment disputes.
In the interests of completeness, in table 3 we report results on exit. Statistically this is quite 
challenging insofar as we have only 10 firms in the data set that quit North Korea. Manufacturing firms 
are more likely to have quit the North Korean market after entering. If one controls for size, SOEs are 
more likely to quit, but this result is fragile.
In sum, investment is done by larger firms, possibly with external finance although this finding is 
not robust. Potential investors who believe that they can make direct appeals to North Korean officials 
to resolve disputes are more likely to commit. Belief in the ability of Chinese authorities to come to the 
support of firms facing disputes has no effect on investment. Although China-North Korea trade is often 
treated as highly political, the firms that have invested appear to recognize that they are on their own. 
They have possibly learned that the infrastructure is even worse than expected and the need to engage in 
bribery even greater. But they appear to have accepted the latter as it is an integral part of the operating 
environment, believing that the benefits of bribery in terms of securing political connections and support 
outweigh its financial costs. 
reguLAtioN AND corruPtioN
Once firms enter and invest, the operating environment is adversely affected by both macroeconomic 
policy (the depreciation of the exchange rate; perceived tax rates) and the inadequacy of physical infra-
structure. But some of the problems firms face clearly relate to the nature of the regulatory environment, 
arbitrary and capricious changes in policy and the consequent need to bribe public officials in order to 
conduct business. What firms are most adversely affected by these constraints and what are their strategies 
for dealing with them?
Table 4 reports regressions on a question about whether regulations make it hard to conduct 
business in North Korea; 70 percent of the surveyed enterprises agreed or strongly agreed with this 
statement. The results are reported in two forms. In specifications 4.1 and 4.2, the dependent variable is 
a binary variable taking the value 1 if the respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that 
regulations were a problem. In specifications 4.3 and 4.4, the values of the dependent variable run from 1 
(totally disagree) to 4 (totally agree) and the regressions are estimated using an ordered probit estimator. 
In both cases, a positive coefficient is associated with greater sensitivity to regulatory obstacles.
Many of the results with respect to firm characteristics are subtle and possibly not robust. Even so, 
they suggest that despite the fact that small firms are more likely to enter, and despite the fact that they 14
engage in activities that reduce risk, such as focusing solely on exports and avoiding contact with officials, 
they are nonetheless more likely to find the regulatory environment a problem. Small, private firms appear 
particularly sensitive (4.2, 4.4); medium-sized firms (measured by sales) appear advantaged relative to 
small firms (4.1, 4.3). SOEs appear relatively untroubled (4.1), which may reflect size or the ability of 
such firms to draw on their political connections in order to operate.
 One apparently robust result is that enterprises that have expected to be able to avail themselves 
to Chinese dispute settlement mechanisms appear disillusioned. There is evidence in specifications 4.1 
and 4.2, that firms with the expectation of using the North Korean court system have relatively positive 
assessments of the business environment, though this result does not hold up in the ordered probit 
specifications. It is not clear whether these expectations are informed by experience.
A second cut at this issue can be taken by examining the determinants of responses to a question 
about whether fears of expropriation make it too risky to invest (table 5). We again obtain the result that 
small or small private firms are more likely to agree, fearing predation. There is some evidence that firms 
that expect to need to engage in bribery are uniquely concerned about expropriation, as are enterprises 
headquartered in border towns, suggesting that such fear may be borne of knowledge. As in the previous 
results regarding investment, enterprises expecting to rely on Chinese authorities for dispute resolution 
appear to understand that such channels will be ineffective once in North Korea and are apprehensive of 
expropriation, while firms that believe that they can rely on North Korean political connections are less 
concerned about expropriation risk. 
 A pervasive response to the weakness of the property right regime is to engage in bribery. 
Regressions on the propensity to bribe are reported in table 6. Again, they are reported as both simple 
and polychotomous ordered probits. We find that firms engaged in trading, which involves the least 
exposure to North Korea and indeed can be conducted within China, feel less compulsion to bribe. But 
there is also some evidence that despite the fact that smaller firms have more adverse views of the business 
environment and are more likely to fear expropriation, larger firms perceive a greater need to bribe; this is 
evidenced by the statistical significance of three of the four employment dummy variables in specifications 
6.1 and 6.3, and the statistically significant negative coefficient on the small, private firm status in 6.2. 
One interpretation of this result is that the North Korean state is predatory and larger firms make 
more attractive targets and thus face more substantial hold-up problems. Once an operation reaches 
a certain size, North Korean officials begin to prey upon it. This is consistent with other evidence of 
economically predatory behavior by the state apparatus (Haggard and Noland 2011). In the extreme, 
the size of operations could well be endogenous to predation; the small size of firms doing business with 15
North Korea, as well as the nature of their operations, is a result of the constraints placed on firm growth 
by the prospects of bribery.11
Again, perceptions of recourse to dispute settlement are interesting. Enterprises that believe that 
they can appeal to either Chinese or North Korean official institutions to manage disputes show no less 
likelihood to believe in the necessity of bribery to conduct business. The one apparently robust result is 
that that those firms that believe they have recourse to informal Chinese third-party dispute settlement are 
less likely to report a need to bribe to conduct business. One interpretation is that if a firm is embedded 
in an informal network, the association or network may deter predation. Such networks may act like a 
reputational mechanism that raises the costs to North Korean officials of extorting individual firms.12
coNcLuSioN
This paper has used an unprecedented survey of Chinese businesses operating in North Korea to explore 
the nature of growing cross-border ties in a setting characterized by weak institutions and property rights 
protections in particular. The Chinese enterprises generally have negative appraisals of the North Korean 
business environment, with large majorities invoking not only the inadequacy of the physical infra-
structure but the problematic nature of the regulatory environment. In response these firms have adopted 
various strategies to reduce risk, including limiting their activity to trading and to exporting in particular; 
these transactions involve less exposure to North Korea and can even be undertaken in China. Such strat-
egies are particularly prevalent among small and small private enterprises and firms that do not believe 
that they can call upon political connections in North Korea. Transactions are undertaken in ways that 
suggest limited trust, including not only settlement in hard currencies but very stringent payment terms 
and limited credit, in effect “cash-and-carry.” 
Bribery and corruption are common. There is some evidence that the likelihood of predation is 
correlated with size, which could add a self-limiting aspect to the expansion of cross-border integration. 
Firms may limit the scale of involvement in order to fly beneath the radar of a predatory state. 
The survey indicates that Chinese firms receive little support from the government, and have a 
limited belief in the ability of their government to protect them in the face of disputes. In the absence of 
11. Specification searches suggested that firms engaged in services and construction are unusually prone to bribery, though 
the evidence presented in table 6 is not compelling on that point. This could possibly relate to the greater propensity for 
enterprises in these business lines to require a local presence to conduct operations.
12. An alternative way of looking at these is that the results on dispute settlement (and the suggestive though statistically 
insignificant results for service and construction firms) are simply proxies for investment. When status as an investor is 
added to the specification, the statistical significance of dispute settlement and sectoral activity variables indeed disappears 
(6.5–6.8). The result that size is correlated with the propensity to bribe holds up, however.16
formal institutions, there is some evidence that Chinese businesses may seek to protect themselves from 
predation via informal networks capable of imposing reputational penalties on North Korean actors. 
As cross-border integration proceeds, presumably so does the number of participants and the 
effective degree of anonymity. Such a development could erode the effectiveness of reputation-based 
sanctions. Unless the increased density of participants strongly promotes the formation of voluntary 
associations (or induces the state to intervene) the ability of the network to identify and sanction those 
who violate contracts may not keep pace with the rise of anonymity. This raises the possibility of another 
self-limiting aspect of the growth of cross-border exchange, as the risk premium on doing business in 
North Korea rises unless offset by a concomitant strengthening of formal or informal institutions. 
There are clearly gains to be had from stronger institutions in North Korea, not only in the volume 
of trade and investment but in an expansion of its scope beyond smaller traders and connected SOE’s. 
Intriguing in this context is recent formation of a North Korean supra-cabinet body to oversee foreign 
direct investment approvals under a 10-year plan announced in January 2011. The positive interpretation 
of this development is that this body could potentially constitute a one-stop shop for investment 
approval and put a stop to the cascading corruption that our survey results indicate deters investment. 
Alternatively, the composition of this group could also be read as a map of the regime’s internal political 
economy, specifically the organizations and factions best positioned to benefit from the extraction of rents 
from foreign investors. Reputation is not established by passing laws or even creating new institutions, 
but through the iterated play between state and economic agents that takes place over time. To date, the 
changeability of North Korean policy has prevented such a positive dynamic from emerging. 17
APPeNDix
A pilot survey was conducted in September 2007 using a survey instrument designed by the authors 
with the actual interviews conducted by the Horizon Research Consultancy Group. Horizon was respon-
sible for securing any local permits and ensuring that the survey was conducted according to ESOMAR 
rules (http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/iccmar.htm). The final survey was 
conducted during October and November 2007. The predominant means of conducting the survey 
was through face-to-face interviews, though some interviews were conducted by telephone. The success 
rate in conducting the interviews was around 7 percent. Among the reasons that interviews could not 
be conducted were refusal by the enterprise to participate prior to or during the interview, inability to 
establish contact with the enterprise, and the unavailability of the person within the enterprise eligible to 
respond according to the survey instrument (chairman, manager etc.). The data—and particularly firm 
addresses—were subject to post-survey verification by random spot-checking.
Given that there are no known or available registries of all Chinese firms doing business with North 
Korea, the sample of firms doing business with North Korea was of necessity a sample of convenience. 
The sample was developed using North Korean, Chinese and Western press accounts, authors’ interviews 
in Northeast China in the summer of 2007 as well as information gathered by the Horizon Group in the 
process of the pilot and interviews with other firms. The sample was drawn from enterprises operating in 
two border provinces—Jilin and Liaoning—due to the practical impossibility of implementing the survey 
on a nationwide basis, particularly with respect to the control group of firms not doing business in North 
Korea.
The design involved a survey of 300 firms, with 250 doing business in North Korea and 50 not 
doing business in North Korea; in the end, we had 53 responses from firms not doing business in North 
Korea. We defined firms doing business with North Korea to include those that were involved in trading 
(import, export or both), investment, or that maintained representative offices in North Korea. Those not 
doing business included 10 firms that had done business and had quit (“the quitters”) and 43 that had 
never done business with North Korea (“the never-weres”). 
The survey began with a pilot of 30 firms from Jilin and Liaoning provinces (20 firms doing 
business in North Korea and 10 firms not doing business in North Korea). Although it was understood 
this was a sample of convenience, enterprises reflecting a broad distribution of size, sector, and provincial 
location were targeted. Following the successful completion of the pilot—which did not require 
fundamental modification of the survey—we were able to transit directly to the full survey and all of the 
pilot firms were included in the final 300 firms. Once the sample of 250 enterprises operating in North 
Korea was completed, the control group was selected by randomly sampling business registries for Jilin 
and Liaoning provinces.18
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Figure 1     China–North Korea Trade
Source: UN Comtrade, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China20 2
Figure 2     Composition of 250 enterprises doing business with North Korea
Source: The China–North Korea business survey.21 3
Figure 3     Firm characteristics of those engaged in business with DPRK
Source: The China–North Korea business survey.
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Figure 4     Age of firms and length of business conducted with DPRK
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Figure 5     Ownership of North Korean counterparties
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Figure 6     Perception of DPRK business environment: those doing business with DPRK  
       (share of those who agree with statement)












Table 1     Enterprises that entered into business  
  relationship with DPRK (binary, includes  
  companies that quit and exited) 
(1.1) (1.2)
Ownership of firm: Private 1.181*
(0.640)
Ownership of firm: State owned enterprise 0.973 0.194
(0.841) (0.644)
Number of Employees: 11-100 –0.810
(0.576)
Number of Employees: 101 plus –1.403**
(0.582)
Small private firm: 1-10 employees 1.016**
(0.495)
Sector: Manufacturing –0.710 –1.156***
(0.504) (0.429)
Sector: Services –1.338** –1.282**
(0.573) (0.529)
Falling value of NKW - problem for business –0.444 –0.694
(0.502) (0.462)
Tax in North Korea is too high –0.836* –0.697*
(0.429) (0.382)
Able to make profit in North Korea 1.079** 0.802*
(0.482) (0.436)
Observations 174 174
Log likelihood  –24.33 –28.11
Chi-squared 38.68 31.12
Pseudo R-squared 0.443 0.356
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: The China-North Korea business survey.26 8
Table 2     Enterprises that invested in DPRK  
  (binary: 1=invest in DPRK 0=did not invest in DPRK) 
(2.1)  (2.2)
No external funding –0.359 –0.364
(0.243) (0.240)
Number of employees: 11-100 0.756***
(0.258)
Number of employees: 101 plus 0.948**
(0.431)
Small private firms: 1 to 10 employees –0.740***
(0.250)
Sales value: 10–50 million RMB 0.840** 0.858**
(0.355) (0.354)
Sector: Construction –1.789** –1.764**
(0.871) (0.879)
Headquarter city bordering DPRK –0.675* –0.663*
(0.382) (0.375)
CEO speaking Korean 0.026 0.016
(0.248) (0.248)
Need bribe to do business with DPRK 0.174 0.202
(0.265) (0.263)
Infrastructure is a problem for our business 0.657* 0.640*
(0.359) (0.356)
Dispute settlement—DPRK political sources 0.680** 0.713***
(0.275) (0.273)
Dispute settlement—DPRK court 0.100 0.041
(0.438) (0.431)
Dispute settlement—Chinese government and court –0.361 –0.374
(0.298) (0.296)
Dispute settlement—Chinese companies –0.730** –0.701*
(0.367) (0.362)
Observations 178 178
Log likelihood  –79.01 –79.71
Chi-squared 68.10 66.71
Pseudo R-squared 0.301 0.295
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: The China-North Korea business survey.27 9
Table 3     Enterprises that quit after engaging in business  
  with DPRK (binary)
(3.1) (3.2)
Ownership of firm: Private 5.239*** 5.459
(0.621) (0.000)
Ownership of firm: State owned enterprise 5.214 5.496***
(0.000) (0.610)
Number of Employees: 11–100 –0.078
(0.355)
Number of Employees: 101 plus 0.403
(0.485)
Sector: Manufacturing 1.087** 0.956**
(0.444) (0.485)
Sector: Trade 0.115 0.162
(0.368) (0.374)
Observations 247 247
Log likelihood  –37.85 –37.39
Chi-squared 8.018 8.955
Pseudo R-squared 0.0958 0.107
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: The China-North Korea business survey.28
10






(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4)
Ownership of firm: Private –5.743 –6.263*** –0.908* –1.222**
(0.000) (0.547) (0.504) (0.532)
Ownership of firm: State owned enterprise –5.519*** –5.547 –0.106 –0.099
(0.520) (0.000) (0.651) (0.638)
Funding source: Relatives and friends –0.852** –0.878** –0.906*** –0.919***
(0.429) (0.429) (0.328) (0.328)
Funding source: No external fund –0.389 –0.404 –0.566*** –0.569***
(0.253) (0.254) (0.186) (0.186)
Small private firm: <=10 million RMB in sales value 0.701** 0.439*
(0.299) (0.238)
Sales value: 10–50 million RMB –0.782** –0.501**
(0.318) (0.252)
Sales value: 50 million RMB plus –0.267 –0.133
(0.523) (0.400)
Dispute settlement – DPRK political sources 0.061 0.041 –0.190 –0.193
(0.284) (0.281) (0.205) (0.204)
Dispute settlement – DPRK court –0.913** –0.884** –0.362 –0.347
(0.404) (0.400) (0.303) (0.303)
Dispute settlement – Chinese government and court 0.849*** 0.867*** 0.603*** 0.610***
(0.291) (0.291) (0.193) (0.193)
Dispute settlement – Chinese companies –0.180 –0.194 –0.165 –0.173
(0.285) (0.283) (0.212) (0.211)
Observation  214 214 214 214
Log likelihood –98.77 –99.06 –241.3 –241.6
Chi–squared 25.20 24.62 29.36 28.79
Pseudo R–squared 0.113 0.111 0.0573 0.0562
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: The China-North Korea business survey.29 11




(1=totally disagree – 
4=totally agree)
(1)  (2)  (3) (4)
Small private firms: 1 to 10 employees 0.557** 0.485** 0.352** 0.302*
(0.231) (0.237) (0.171) (0.175)
Sales value: 10–50 million RMB –0.619** –0.588** –0.641*** –0.610**
(0.298) (0.298) (0.246) (0.248)
Sales value: 50 million RMB plus 0.387 0.518 0.078 0.118
(0.486) (0.512) (0.359) (0.361)
Sector: Construction –0.873** –0.929** –0.905*** –0.939***
(0.372) (0.384) (0.343) (0.347)
Sector: Diversified Group –0.779** –0.792**
(0.380) (0.381)
Sector: Services –0.629** –0.672**
(0.312) (0.314)
Sector: Trade –0.417* –0.435*
(0.228) (0.229)
Headquarter city bordering DPRK 0.422* 0.478**
(0.238) (0.242)
Need bribe to do business with DPRK 0.624*** 0.653***
(0.222) (0.231)
Dispute settlement: DPRK political sources –0.470* –0.349*
(0.275) (0.206)
Dispute settlement: DPRK court 0.204 0.218
(0.419) (0.313)
Dispute settlement: Chinese government and court 0.690*** 0.873*** 0.517*** 0.635***
(0.260) (0.290) (0.189) (0.203)
Dispute settlement: Other Chinese companies –0.265 –0.284
(0.308) (0.220)
Observation  184 184 203 203
Log likelihood –96.01 –94.20 –243.7 –241.5
Chi–squared 28.93 32.55 31.54 35.87
Pseudo R–squared 0.131 0.147 0.0608 0.0691













(1=totally disagree – 
4=totally agree)
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) (5.7) (5.8)
Investing in DPRK  0.380 0.413* 0.395** 0.446**
(0.243) (0.240) (0.194) (0.192)
Number of employees: 11–100 0.339* 0.373** 0.254 0.289*
(0.203) (0.165) (0.210) (0.170)
Number of employees: 101 plus 0.305 0.570* 0.184 0.446
(0.391) (0.314) (0.400) (0.319)
Small private firms: 1 to 10 employees –0.245 –0.283* –0.161 –0.199
(0.197) (0.161) (0.203) (0.166)
Sector: Construction –0.610* –0.620* –0.277 –0.313 –0.526 –0.525 –0.191 –0.211
(0.358) (0.356) (0.286) (0.285) (0.365) (0.363) (0.289) (0.289)
Sector: Services  –0.538 –0.561 –0.397 –0.440 –0.519 –0.534 –0.371 –0.406
(0.370) (0.368) (0.291) (0.292) (0.372) (0.371) (0.292) (0.293)
Sector: Trade –0.506* –0.518* –0.454** –0.503** –0.488* –0.490* –0.428** –0.465**
(0.278) (0.271) (0.209) (0.204) (0.280) (0.273) (0.209) (0.205)
Dispute settlement: DPRK political sources 0.406 0.423* 0.232 0.269 0.316 0.320 0.134 0.151
(0.251) (0.249) (0.198) (0.196) (0.259) (0.257) (0.204) (0.203)
Dispute settlement: DPRK court –0.262 –0.291 0.282 0.258 –0.293 –0.317 0.252 0.232
(0.365) (0.362) (0.303) (0.303) (0.371) (0.368) (0.305) (0.304)
Dispute settlement: Chinese government and court –0.138 –0.141 –0.222 –0.230 –0.140 –0.140 –0.216 –0.221
(0.220) (0.220) (0.181) (0.181) (0.221) (0.221) (0.182) (0.181)
Dispute settlement: Other Chinese companies –0.449* –0.448* –0.366* –0.370* –0.378 –0.370 –0.290 –0.284
(0.252) (0.251) (0.209) (0.209) (0.256) (0.255) (0.213) (0.212)
Observation  201 201 205 205 201 201 205 205
Log likelihood –123.2 –123.9 –257.0 –258.8 –122.0 –122.4 –254.9 –256.1
Chi–squared 19.08 17.71 24.29 20.73 21.55 20.71 28.42 26.16
Pseudo R–squared 0.0719 0.0667 0.0451 0.0385 0.0812 0.0780 0.0528 0.0486
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: The China-North Korea business survey.